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Deterrence Effect of Civil Penalties, Potential
Loss of Recreational and Economic Use by
Plaintiff Organization's Members, and Absence of a
Clear Indication of Eliminating Future Violations
Will Meet Article III Mootness and Standing
Requirements for Clean Water Act ("CWX') Citizen
Suits: Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw
Environmental Services (TOC), Inc.
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW -

CLEAN WATER ACT ("CWA") -

MOOTNESS AND

The Supreme
Court of the United States ruled that citizen suits brought under
the CWA are moot due to subsequent compliance with permit limits
or subsequent facility closure only if it is absolutely clear that the
permit violations cannot reasonably be expected to recur, that
organizations have standing to seek civil penalties under the CWA
if the penalties deter ongoing permit violations that could continue
in the future and create the likelihood of redressing the
organization members' injuries, and that plaintiff's failure to appeal
a federal court's denial of injunctive relief does not moot a civil
penalties claim on appeal.
STANDING ISSUES FOR CITIZEN SUITS UNDER THE CWA -

Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services
(TOC), Inc., 120 S. Ct. 693 (2000).
Laidlaw Environmental Services ("Laidlaw") was cited by the
South Carolina. Department of Health and Environmental Control
("DHEC") for numerous mercury limit violations of the National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit for a
Roebuck, South Carolina, wastewater treatment plant.' Within a
year of the date Laidlaw purchased the Roebuck Plant, the South
Carolina DHEC issued the NPDES permit for the wastewater
facility with new and more stringent limits for discharges into the
1, Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Services (TOC), Inc., 890 F. Supp. 470,
477 (D. S.C. 1995). The wastewater treatment plant treated water from a hazardous waste
incinerator before discharging the effluent into the North Iyger River. Id. at 474. Laidlaw
purchased the incinerator and wastewater plant from ABCO Industries in January, 1986. Id.
at 475.
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North Tyger River.2 The NPDES permit was issued to Laidlaw by
the DHEC pursuant to the CWA and the delegation authority of the
United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA). 3 The
NPDES permit regulated a range of discharge parameters that
included metal discharge concentrations, effluent flow rate,
discharge temperature, and discharge pH. 4 As a condition related to
the 1987 mercury permit limits, the South Carolina DHEC called for
feasibility studies to be performed by Laidlaw to assess potential
technologies that could achieve the long-term mercury limit of 1.3
parts-per-billion ("ppb"). 5 Pursuant to the DHEC directive, Laidlaw
retained Environmental Technology Engineering ("ETE") to
evaluate potential technologies to control mercury emissions.6 ETE
concluded that installing a second carbon absorption unit at the
7
plant should allow the facility to meet the 1.3 ppb mercury limit.
Based on this recommendation, Laidlaw purchased and installed a
second carbon absorption unit in early 1988.8
Operation with the second carbon absorption unit in 1988 and
1989 did not result in consistent compliance with the 1.3 ppb
mercury limit.9 After a major fish kill on the North Tyger River in
May, 1988, the South Carolina DHEC initiated an administrative
action and obtained a consent order on September 7, 1988, that
required Laidlaw to investigate alternative technologies for attaining
2. Id. at 475. After Laidlaw's initial purchase of the facility and for most of 1986, the
wastewater plant operated under the prior permit issued to ABCO. Id. Relative to the prior
ABCO permit, the most significant reduction found in the 1987 Laidlaw permit was for
mercury. Id. The ABCO NPDES permit had a mercury limit of 20 parts per billion ("ppb")
while the 1987 Laidlaw NPDES permit instituted an interim limit of 10 ppb for 1987 and a
long-term limit of 1.3 ppb to be effective on January 1, 1988. Id.
3. Id. EPA delegation of permit issuance and enforcement responsibilities to the
DHEC pursuant to section 402(b) of the CWA occurred on June 10, 1975. Id. at 484 n.5.
Section 402(b) of the CWA authorizes each state to develop and monitor its own NPDES
permit program. Id. The state program is subject to approval and review by the EPA. Id.
4. Id. at 475. Regulated metals under the permit included antimony, arsenic, cadmium,
chromium, copper, lead, mercury, and nickel. Id. The NPDES permit also imposed a range of
monitoring and reporting requirements for compliance management. Id.
5. Id. At the time of the issuance of the initial NPDES permit, the wastewater plant
was equipped with a neutralization system and a carbon absorption filter. Id. at 476.
6. Friends of the Earth, Inc., 890 F Supp. at 476.
7. Id.
8. Id. The 1987 NPDES permit contained an option that allowed Laidlaw to request a
higher mercury limit pending the results of the directed feasibility studies. Id. at 475-76.
However, based on ETE's recommendation that compliance with the mercury permit limit
should be attainable via the additional carbon absorption unit, Laidlaw chose not to request
a higher mercury discharge limit. Id. at 476.
9. Id.

2000

Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Services

permit compliance. 10 In response to the consent order, Laidlaw
retained RMT, Inc., to study and pilot test possible solutions to the
ongoing metals discharge problems." In December, 1989, the RMT,
Inc. study results, which recommended the Lancy System as the
most promising choice for controlling and reducing wastewater
emissions, were provided to the DHEC. 12 On July 10, 1990, the
South Carolina DHEC granted approval and a construction permit
for the installation of the Lancy System at the Roebuck Plant.13 The
Lancy System was installed by the end of February, 1991; even
though compliance with all non-mercury metal permit limits was
achieved, it was evident that the wastewater facility could not meet
the 1.3 ppb mercury limit.' 4 Laidlaw submitted a request on June
26, 1991,for modification of the existing NPDES permit to reflect a
higher mercury emission limit and also conducted a study that
investigated mercury levels in North Tyger River fish. 15 The permit
16
modification request was denied by the DHEC.
On April 10, 1992, the environmental organization Friends of the
Earth, Inc., ("FOE") sent a letter to Laidlaw, the DHEC, and the
EPA that gave notice of FOE's intention to file a citizen suit under
the CWA after expiration of the required sixty day waiting period.17
The DHEC commenced a formal Notice of Enforcement Action
against Laidlaw on May 21, 1992, and issued a Notice of
10. Id. The South Carolina DHEC concluded the fish il resulted from a swing in the
pH level of the plant discharge. Id. The South Carolina DHEC also imposed a $20,000 penalty
and required Laidlaw to replace the killed fish. Id.
11. Friends of the Earth, Inc., 890 F Supp. at 476.
12. Id. RMT, Inc., evaluated through pilot testing the Unipure, Lancy, and Mem Tek
metal removal systems. Id. Each of these systems utilized a different process concept and
design for metal removal and water treatment. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. Operational testing by Laidlaw and the manufacturer of the Lancy System failed
to improve mercury removal performance to the level required for permit compliance. Id.
15. Id.
16. Friends of the Earth, Inc., 890 F. Supp. at 477.
17. Id. The sixty-day notice period expired on June 9, 1992. Id. The CWA provides the
following guidelines regarding who may bring a citizen suit and what notice guidelines must
be met:
[Any citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf... against any person
who is alleged to be in violation of ... an effluent standard or limitation under this
Act or . . . an order issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to such a
standard or limitation. No action may be commenced prior to sixty days after the
plaintiff has given notice of the alleged violation to the Administrator, to the State in
which the alleged violation occurs, and to any alleged violator of the standard,
limitation, or order ....
33 U.S.C. §1365 (1994).
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Enforcement Conference. 8 The Notice of Enforcement Action
charged Laidlaw with 223 violations of the mercury permit limit
and two violations of the antimony permit limit since April, 1991.19
An enforcement conference was held between Laidlaw and the
DHEC on June 5, 1992, and the parties reached a final consent
agreement on June 8, 1992, that imposed a $100,000 penalty on
Laidlaw, that was approved by a state circuit judge on June 10,
1992.20 Counsel for Laidlaw requested that the DHEC file a suit
against Laidlaw instead of pursuing the more common approach of
proceeding with an administrative action in order to bar the
threatened citizen suit by FOE.21 Laidlaw filed the judicial
complaint that led to judge-approval on behalf of the DHEC on
June 9, 1992, in the Court of Common Pleas of Spartanburg
County, South Carolina. 22 Even though a $100,000 penalty was
imposed, the consent order did not declare an injunction of the
Roebuck facility; but instead it required Laidlaw to make every
effort to comply with the order, and it also provided that the terms
of the order would shelter Laidlaw from all liability that arose from
violations occurring during the periods covered by the order.23 An
economic benefit of noncompliance analysis, which is a financial
assessment procedure to estimate the economic gain of a polluter
resulting from delayed compliance or noncompliance and which the
EPA advises state agencies to employ when estimating penalties for
24
NPDES permit violations, was not performed by the DHEC.
Imposing the economic benefit of noncompliance as a penalty on
Laidlaw would have amounted to a greater punishment than the
$100,000 penalty imposed by the DHEC in the consent agreement."
After the consent order, Laidlaw continued to struggle to meet
the NPDES permit limit for mercury, continued to experiment with
18. Friends of the Earth, Inc., 890 F. Supp. at 477.
19. Id. The fact sheet reflecting Laidlaw's discharge monitoring reports that
accompanied the Notice of Enforcement Conference served as the documentation for the
alleged permit violations. Id. The DHEC did not allege in the notice any monitoring or
reporting violations by Laidlaw. Id.
20. Id. at 477, 479. Although the enforcement conference was commenced on June 5,
1992, subsequent negotiations to reach a final consent agreement occurred on June 8, 1992.
Id. at 477. The DHEC initially sought a $120,000 penalty but the parties later settled on a
$100,000 penalty. Id. at 479.
21. Id. at 478. The DREC agreed to file the suit as long as any additional expense
incurred in filing and commencement was paid for by Laidlaw. Id.
22. Id. at 479. The consent order was entered on June 10, 1992. Id.
23. Friends of the Earth,Inc., 890 F Supp. at 480.
24. Id. at 480-81.
25. Id. at 482.
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design and operational modifications to the wastewater facility, and
elected to allow the incinerator and wastewater plant to sit idle for
substantial periods during the latter half of 1992 to avoid violating
the consent order.26 Finally, after extensive testing, Laidlaw was
able to meet the mercury permit limit on a consistent basis by
installing activated carbon filters at the backend of the Lancy
Process and by adding a micro-filter and an ion resin exchange unit
after the carbon filters.2 7 After Laidlaw demonstrated compliance
with the NPDES permit mercury limit, the DHEC expressed their
28
intent to allow the consent order to expire.
Plaintiffs FOE filed a citizen suit against Laidlaw on June 12,
1992, in the United States District Court for the District of South
Carolina, two days after the court-approved final consent
agreement between Laidlaw and the DHEC and two days after the
29
expiration of the sixty day CWA notice period for citizen suits.
The FOE alleged at least 1044 discharge violations of the NPDES
30
permit by Laidlaw since the granting of the 1987 NPDES permit.
The FOE complaint also alleged additional NPDES permit
violations related to monitoring and reporting requirements. 31 On
July 1, 1992, the defendant Laidlaw moved to dismiss the FOE
action per section 505(b)(1)(B) of the CWA, arguing that the citizen
suit should be barred since state action had been commenced to
prosecute Laidlaw for noncompliance with the DHEC permit. 32 The
federal district court later granted a motion by FOE to join the
Sierra Club as an additional plaintiff.3 On December 14, 1992, the
court denied Laidlaw the requested motion to dismiss and ordered
an evidentiary hearing on the issues of citizen suit proceedings and
whether the DHEC "diligently prosecuted" the consent order
26. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Services, Inc., 956 F. Supp. 588, 595
(D.S.C. 1997).
27. Id. at 595-96.
28. Id. at 596. A DHEC attorney notified the state court of the DHEC's intent to allow
the consent order to expire in an August 6, 1993, letter. Id. The consent order explicitly
stated that it. would terminate when Laidlaw complied with its terms. Friends of the Earth,
Inc., 890 F Supp. at 480.
29. Friends of the Earth, Inc., 890 E Supp. at 477.
30. Id. The FOE complaint also alleged a long history of permit violations by Laidlaw
and that most of the permit violations were for mercury. Id. FOE alleged that Laidlaw
violated the mercury permit level on almost a daily basis from early 1991 through June 18,
1992. Id. Thirty-one discharge violations were alleged to have occurred after the final
consent agreement between the DHEC and Laidlaw. Id.
31. Id. at 477-78. Plaintiffs FOE alleged at least 676 monitoring violations and 615
reporting violations. Id.
32. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Services, Inc., 120 S. Ct. 693, 702 (2000).
33.

Id.
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against Laidlaw.4
On April 7, 1995, the district court issued its opinion relating to
the evidentiary hearing. 35 The decision stated that although phrased
in the present tense in the CWA, section 505(b)(1)(B) should be
read to bar citizen suits during and after state agency prosecution
as long as diligent prosecution was evident.3 6 In addition, the court
concluded that because the CWA is a federal statute, a federal
standard should be used to determine what constitutes diligent
prosecution. 3 The district court ruled that the burden of showing
lack of diligent prosecution is on the plaintiff, that this is a heavy
burden because diligence is presumed, and that the statutory grant
of a sixty day notice period prior to the commencement of citizen
suits indicates that Congress intended to give the state agency the
38
first opportunity at enforcing permit violations.
Despite the heavy burden that FOE had to meet to show lack of
diligence on behalf of the DHEC, the court ruled that this burden
was met due to the numerous procedural deficiencies that were
present in the consent order litigation. 39 Specific instances
enumerated in the opinion included the lack of injunctive relief, the
vague requirement of "making every effort towards compliance" to
be demonstrated by Laidlaw, the inability to specify penalty
provisions for future violations, and the discharge of all other
related liabilities for the period of the consent order.40 In addition,
the court found that the most serious evidence of a lack of diligent
prosecution on the part of the DHEC was the relatively small
penalty of $100,000 that was imposed on Laidlaw under the consent
order relative to what the penalty would have been under the
economic benefit of noncompliance analysis. 41 Finally, the court
stated that violations of the NPDES permit are strict liability
offenses and, as such, Laidlaw's reasonableness or good faith
efforts toward compliance are irrelevant for determining liability
and should only impact the amount of the penalty imposed.42 Since
the DHEC did not demonstrate diligent prosecution of the Laidlaw
34. Id. at 697.
35. Friends of the Earth, Inc., 890 F. Supp. at 486.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 486 n.8.
38. Id. at 486-87.
39. Id. at 498.
40. Friends of the Earth, Inc., 890 F. Supp. at 490-91.
41. Id. at 497-98. The court estimated that under the South Carolina Pollution Control
Act, a $2,270,000 penalty could have been assessed. Id. at 491.
42. Id. at 496.
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violations under the consent order, FOE was allowed to proceed
43
with the citizen suit.
After the decision of the district court concerning the existence
of diligent prosecution, the defendant Laidlaw moved the court to
reconsider or, in the alternative, to certify an order for an
interlocutory appeal.44 The motion to reconsider was denied due to
the rejection of the defendant's argument that the finding of
non-diligence on the part of the DHEC solely hinged upon the
assessed penalty under the consent order not being equivalent to
the amount of economic benefit from non-compliance. 45 The motion
for interlocutory appeal was not granted because of the incentive
to avoid piecemeal appeals where possible and because of the low
likelihood that the litigation would be shortened substantially by
the granting of the motion. 46 Subsequently, Laidlaw moved for
summary judgement on grounds that FOE failed to demonstrate
injury-in-fact and, as a result, lacked Article III standing to bring
the suit.47 FOE, in opposition to the motion, submitted numerous
affidavits and deposition testimony from members of the
organization that alleged loss of recreational benefits and economic
harm resulting from the environmental impact of the permit
violations. 48 Upon reviewing the evidence supplied by members of
FOE, the district court found that FOE had standing and denied
49
Laidlaw's motion for summary judgement.
After the court's finding of lack of diligent prosecution by the
DHEC and the ruling that FOE could proceed with its citizen suit,
the district court entered its final judgement in January, 1997, and
imposed a $405,800 penalty on Laidlaw for the NPDES permit
violations.50 Key findings included that Laidlaw committed 489
43. Id. at 498.
44. Id. Both defendant motions were denied on July 7, 1995. Id. at 499.
45. Friends of the Earth, Inc., 890 F. Supp. at 499.
46. Id.
47. Friends of the Earth, Inc., 120 S. Ct. at 702.
48. Id. at 696-97. FOE member Kenneth Lee Curtis averred in an affidavit that he
thought the river looked and smelled polluted and that he would no longer camp or fish
downstream from the Roebuck facility due to concerns about pollution from the plant. Id. at
704. Citizen Local Environmental Action Network ("CLEAN") member Angela Patterson
stated that she no longer picnicked near or walked/waded along the river due to concerns
about the plant discharges. Id. at 704-05. Patterson also stated that her original intention to
buy a home near the river was extinguished by her concerns about the discharges from the
Laidlaw facility. Id. CLEAN member Gail Lee averred that her home near the river had a
lower value than similar homes away from the river, due partly to the community's
knowledge of and collective concern about the Laidlaw facility discharges. Id.
49. Id. at 705.
50. Friends of the Earth, Inc., 956 F Supp. at 612.
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violations of the mercury limit in the 1987 permit and that only
nine of the violations occurred after the Lancy System was in place
and had undergone start-up testing.51 Laidlaw was also found to be
in violation of 420 monitoring and 503 reporting requirements. 2
Based on these violations and using the economic benefit of
noncompliance approach to assess penalties, the court determined
that the gross penalty that should have been imposed on Laidlaw,
excluding other mitigating factors, was $1,092,581.5 However, in
assessing the penalty, the court factored into the calculation a
number of mitigating factors, including Laidlaw's reasonable and
good-faith selection and start-up operation of the Lancy system, the
non-serious nature of the monitoring and reporting violations, and
the lack of data indicating that the facility's mercury emissions
adversely affected the environment or fish population. 54 These
mitigating factors were used to adjust and reduce the penalty from
$1,092,581 to $405,800 plus a significant portion of the legal fees of
FOE.5 5 Injunctive relief was denied to FOE and was not deemed
applicable since Laidlaw was in substantial compliance with the
NPDES permit at the time of the ruling and there was no
56
demonstrated harm to the environment by the plaintiffs.
Following the decision of the district court, FOE appealed the
amount of the penalty to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit. 57 The appellate court found that the plaintiffs lacked
standing since the redressability requirement was not met because
FOE only appealed the amount of the penalty, which was to be
paid to the government and, therefore, could not be used to redress
any injury to the plaintiffs. 58 An appeal challenging the denial of
injunctive relief would have met the redressability requirement for
standing, but FOE chose not to appeal that ruling. 59 The appellate
court remanded the case to the district court and instructed the
60
district court to reverse its prior decision.
Upon the Fourth Circuit's decision, FOE requested a writ of
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
(4th Cir.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 600.
Id.
Id. at 603.
Id. at 602, 603, 607.
Friendsof the Earth, Inc., 956 F Supp. at 610-11.
Id. at 611.
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Services (TOC), Inc., 149 F3d 303, 305
1998).
Id. at 306.
Id.
Id. at 307.
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certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.61 During this same
period, Laidlaw idled and partially dismantled the Roebuck Plant
62
and placed the facility on the market for sale.
Upon granting certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the Fourth
Circuit's ruling and found that the controversy was not moot and,
in addition, that FOE had standing under the citizen suit provision
of the CWA.63 Justice Ginsberg, writing for the majority, stated that
an organization has standing on behalf of its members if the
members would have standing to sue in their own right, the
interests in question are pertinent to the organization's primary
objectives, and the individual participation of members in the suit
is not required. 64 Also, the majority ruled that it is injury to the
plaintiff and not injury to the environment that is critical to
determining whether the injury-in-fact requirement for standing is
present. 65 Using the affidavits and depositions of members of FOE
that were submitted during the Fourth Circuit's review of the case,
the majority concluded that injury-in-fact to FOE was present in
the form of lost recreational, aesthetic, and economic interests tied
to the North Tyger River.66 An additional element required for
standing, redressability of the plaintiffs injury, was found to be
present by assuming that the civil penalties that were imposed
upon Laidlaw as a result of permit violations would serve as a
deterrent to future harm to the plaintiff and would provide redress
even though the penalty was paid to the government as opposed to
6
the plaintiff.
The majority rejected Laidlaw's claim that subsequent and
substantial compliance with the NPDES permit made the issues on
appeal automatically moot. 68 For a case to become moot through
voluntary cessation of the behavior in question, it must be
absolutely clear that the behavior could not be reasonably expected
to recur.6 9 The Court determined that the adoption of the Fourth
Circuit's definition of mootness as standing set in a time frame
could be erroneous because behavior that is capable of repetition
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Friends of the Earth, Inc., 120 S. Ct. at 703.
Id.
Id. at 704, 711.
Id. at 704.
Id.
Friends of the Earth, Inc., 120 S. Ct. at 705.
Id. at 706.
Id. at 711.
Id.
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yet evades review may not be moot.70 Of particular interest to the
Court was Laidlaw's decision to keep its NPDES permit after the
Roebuck facility was idled because such a decision could be
interpreted to threaten future facility operation and subsequent
permit violations.7 The Supreme Court, by deferring to the district
court, passed on deciding FOE's request for reimbursement of its
72
legal fees by Laidlaw under the catalyst theory of the CWA.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens stated that the issue of
the proper amount of damages for permit violations is analogous to
punitive damages issues and, as such, the case would not be moot
even if it was absolutely clear that Laidlaw had permanently gone
out of business and threatened no future permit violations. 73 A
second concurring opinion by Justice Kennedy raised a concern
that delegation of administrative authority to citizens via the citizen
suit provision of the CWA could potentially violate the
constitutional concept of separation of powers. 74 Since this issue
was not raised in either the petition for certiorari or the lower
court decisions, Justice Kennedy reserved review for a future
75
case.
In the dissenting opinion, Justices Scalia and Thomas argued that
FOE as plaintiffs failed to demonstrate injury-in-fact and, thus, did
not have standing. 76 The affidavits and depositions supplied by the
members of FOE that alleged decreased recreational and economic
use were vague, non-quantifiable, and should be treated as no more
than general averments. 77 Although the dissent agreed with the
majority's view that injury to the plaintiff and not injury to the
environment is critical for determining injury-in-fact, the dissent
argued that there was no quantifiable injury to the environment
caused by Laidlaw and, therefore, there could be no injury to the
70. Id. at 709.
71. Friends of the Earth, Inc., 120 S. Ct. at 711.
72. Id. at 711-12. Under the CWA, legal fees may be recovered by the citizen plaintiff
from the violating defendant if the plaintiff was a prevailing party and if the plaintiff was the
catalyst that triggered the enforcement of the CWA: "The court, in issuing any final order in
any action brought pursuant to this section, may award costs of litigation (including
reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to any prevailing or substantially prevailing
party, whenever the court determines such award is appropriate." 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (2000).
73. Friends of the Earth, Inc., 120 S. Ct. at 712 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice
Stevens did note that the case would be moot if the only issue on appeal concerned
injunctive relief. Id.
74. Id. at 713 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 713-14 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
77. Id.
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plaintiff because the plaintiff's interest in the case was tied to the
environment. 8 The dissent concluded that adopting the majority's
standard for assessing injury-in-fact will make that requirement of
standing nothing more than a technicality that can be met with
79
ease.
Justices Scalia and Thomas also argued that even if the
injury-in-fact requirement is ignored, there is still a problem with
the plaintiff's standing as it relates to redressability.8 0 FOE's claim
of a particularized future injury was used to secure generalized
penalties for past violations.8 1 In the eyes of the dissent, the
majority has developed a boundless form of deterrence standing
that will permit private parties to enforce and impose penalties that
are public in nature.82 This would give prospective plaintiffs great
power in choosing targets for enforcement violations and may
create separation of powers problems by allowing private citizens
to act as quasi-governmental agencies.83
Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution requires
that judicial authority be limited to cases or controversies s4 An
element for meeting this case or controversy requirement is
standing, part of which is injury-in-fact.8 5 One of the primary United
States Supreme Court cases that discussed the level of
particularized injury-in-fact that is necessary to meet the standing
requirement for plaintiffs bringing suit under environmental laws is
the 1972 case of Sierra Club v. Morton.8 6 The issue under review
was whether a plaintiff adequately alleged injury-in-fact when he
averred that the challenged activity negatively impacted upon the
78. Friends of the Earth, Inc., 120 S. Ct. at 714 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
79. Id. at 715. Justice Scalia referred to the majority's standard as a "sham"
requirement that would most closely resemble pleading requirements. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 719 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
83. Friends of the Earth, Inc., 120 S. Ct. at 719. This argument is similar to the
concern presented in Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion. Id. at 713 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
84.

U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2.

85.

JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTI

ONAL LAW 77-79 (5th ed. 1995).

86. Sierra Club v. Morton, 92 S. Ct. 1361 (1972). A conservation club brought suit
against federal officials in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the granting of approval and
issuance of permits for mining activities in Mineral King Valley, a national game refuge. Id. at
1363-64. Although the suit was dismissed for lack of standing because the plaintiff Sierra
Club asserted no individualized harm to itself or to its members, the Court affirmed that
injury-in-fact need not be purely economic in nature. Id. at 1366, 1367, 1369.
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plaintiff's use or enjoyment of the land.8 7 The Supreme Court
reasoned that the injury-in-fact element of standing can be met by
alleging harm to purely aesthetic or recreational interests. 88
Environmental
well-being,
like economic
well-being, was
de-termined to be an important element of society.8 9 In addition, the
Court concluded that even though certain environmental interests
are common to society as a whole, this will not prevent a plaintiff
from bringing suit as long as the plaintiff has suffered personal
90
injury.
The Supreme Court carefully differentiated between a plaintiff's
subjective apprehensions of harm from a defendant's conduct and
the reasonable probability of such harm occurring in the 1983 case
of City of Los Angeles v. Lyons.9 1 Justice White, writing for the
majority, stated that a plaintiff's subjective apprehensions
concerning the potential results of a defendant's conduct are not
enough, in themselves, to show imminent injury-in-fact for
standing. 92 Instead, there must be some showing of a realistic threat
or reasonable expectation of injury.93 This reasoning was used to
deny the equitable remedy of an injunction where the plaintiff was
unable to show any real or immediate threat of imminent or future
harm. 94 The Court ruled that a likelihood of immediate and
substantial harm needs to be present to support the injury-in-fact
95
requirement for standing.
Subsequently, the Supreme Court in the 1992 case of Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife96 analyzed whether a plaintiff, who intended
to engage in future recreational and outdoor activities in an area,
could be harmed by a defendant's conduct in that area to such a
degree as to meet the injury-in-fact requirement. 97 Justice Scalia, in
87. Id. at 1366.
88. Id. at 1368.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. 103 S. Ct. 1660 (1983). This action was a citizen suit that sought an injunction,
declaratory relief, and damages against the City of Los Angeles. Id. at 1663. The City allowed
its police officers to employ a choke-hold on suspects when faced with non-deadly force. Id.
at 1664. The plaintiff Lyons suffered damage to his larynx from the hold during a traffic stop
and sought the injunction out of fear of future encounters with police officers. Id. at 1663.
92. Id. at 1668 n.8:
93. Id. at 1668.
94. Id. at 1670.
95. Id.
96. 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992).
97. Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2138. The plaintiffs filed an action against the'Secretary of the
Interior in the United States District Court for Minnesota seeking a declaratory judgment that
a regulation defining the Secretary's power to review government involvement with projects
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writing the Court's opinion, stated that an injury-in-fact must be
concrete and particularized and that general claims of future plans
to travel and view ecological areas or Wildlife are not sufficient by
themselves.98 The Court's opinion explained that a nexus theory,
standing by itself, that attempts to show injury-in-fact by the harm
to a contiguous system that the plaintiff is only distantly connected
to will fail to meet the standing burden without a showing of
particularized and concrete injury.9 The Supreme Court reasoned
that the ecosystem, animal, and vocational nexus theories fail to
demonstrate injury-in-fact without the showing of a more
proximate, immediate, and specific harm to the plaintiff.' °°
More recently, in the 1998 case of Steel Co. v. Citizens for a
Better Environment,'01 the Supreme Court addressed the issue of
whether a defendant's failure to meet reporting requirements in a
timely fashion constitutes an injury-in-fact to an environmental
organization plaintiff that had an interest in the information and in
deterring the defendant from future reporting violations. 10 2 The
majority ruled that under a citizen suit provision, an organization's
general interest in the deterrence of future defendant violations is
not enough, in itself, to create the requisite injury-in-fact. 1°3 In
addition, the organization's attempt to include the litigation costs as
an additional form of injury-in-fact did not pass the standing
analysis.' °4 However, the Court did point out that costs incurred by
the organization through the investigation of whether the defendant
an
violated the reporting requirements could constitute
0
5
injury-in-fact.
An additional element required to show plaintiff-standing is
redressability, which is the likelihood that the requested relief will
impacted by the Endangered Species Act be modified to include involvement in international
projects. Id. at 2135-36. To show standing and injury-in-fact, the plaintiff organization made
averments about threats to members' future plans to visit far away lands and to view wildlife
on those trips. Id. at 2137.
98. Id. at 2138. Examples of the evidence offered by the plaintiff to establish
injury-in-fact and standing was an affidavit of a member who intended to travel to Egypt to
observe the endangered Nile crocodile and an affidavit of a member who planned to travel
to Sri Lanka to observe the Asian elephant and leopard. Id. at 2137, 2138.
99. Id. at 2139.
100. Id. at 2140.
101. 118 S. Ct. 1003 (1998).
102. Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1017-18. The respondent had an interest in using
information that must be disclosed by the petitioner under the Emergency Planning and
Community Right to Know Act of 1986. Id. at 1017.
103. Id. at 1019.
104. Id.
105. Id.
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remedy the alleged injury. 06 In the 1973 Supreme Court case of
Linda R. S. v. Richard D.,107 the Court investigated how distant the
nexus between the plaintiff's redress and the sought after relief
could be before the redress element of standing would not be
satisfied. 08° The majority held that a mother-appellant's failure to
effectively show that enforcement of a state statute, that punished
a parent for willfully neglecting child support obligations, would
result in the support of her child rather than in the mere jailing of
the child's father caused a lack of redressability. 10 9 Justice Marshall,
writing for the Court, expressed the view that the mere prospect
that prosecution could result in the redress of the plaintiff's injury
is too speculative, by itself, to meet the redress requirement for
standing." 0 According to the Court, private citizens do not have a
judicially recognized interest in the mere prosecution of another
citizen."'
The notion that mere speculation concerning possible redress is
not sufficient to meet standing requirements that was expressed by
the Supreme Court in Linda R. S. in 1973 was echoed in 1992 in
Lujan." 2 The Lujan majority reiterated that it must be likely and
not merely speculative that the plaintiff's injury will be redressed
by a favorable judicial decision. 1 3 Redress was deemed not likely
106. NowAK, supra note 85, at 76.
107. 93 S. Ct. 1146 (1973).
108. Linda R. S., 93 S. Ct. at 1149.
109. Id. at 1149. The appellant, the mother of an illegitimate child, brought a class
action suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, seeking an
injunction against the discriminatory application of a Texas criminal statute making a
parent's willful desertion, neglect, or refusal to provide for the support and maintenance of a
child a misdemeanor punishable by jail time. Id. at 1147. The United States Supreme Court
held that the appellant failed to allege a sufficient nexus between her injury and the
government action which she attacked to justify judicial intervention. Id. at 1149.
Specifically, the appellant failed to show that enforcement of the statute would result in the
support of her child rather than in the mere jailing of the child's father. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2136. The Endangered Species Act ("ESA') requires federal
agencies to consult with the Secretary of the Interior to ensure that actions authorized or
funded by such agencies will not jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered
species. Id. at 2135. In 1978, the Fish and Wildlife Service' and the National Marine Fisheries
Service created joint regulations declaring that these obligations extended to actions taken in
foreign nations. Id. However, a revised joint regulation, promulgated in 1986, reinterpreted
the ESA to require consultation only for actions taken in the United States. Id. After this
reinterpretation, environmental organizations filed an action against the Secretary of the
Interior in the United States District Court for Minnesota seeking a declaratory judgment that
the regulation was erroneous as to the ESA's geographical scope as well as an injunction
requiring the Secretary to return to the initial interpretation. Id.
113. Id. at 2136.
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to occur since the government agencies involved in the conduct in
question were not parties to the case and the agencies only
provided a fraction of the total funding for the foreign projects that
allegedly caused the plaintiffs injury-in-fact. 14 According to the
Court, the relief requested by a plaintiff must be likely to not only
redress an injury-in-fact, but it also must be likely to redress the
11 5
particular injury-in-fact alleged.
The United States Supreme Court in Steel Co.11 6 analyzed whether

redressability may not be present even when a defendant has
directly injured the plaintiff.11 7 The majority stated that where there
can be no controversy as to whether the defendant violated a law,
there is no redress if the plaintiff seeks equitable relief through a
declaratory judgement or if the plaintiff seeks injunctive relief with
no continuing violation or imminence of future violations.",, More
importantly, according to the Steel Co. Court, an environmental
organization's request for civil penalties as a result of a defendant's
failure to meet statutory reporting requirements will not redress the
plaintiff's injuries because the money will be paid to the
government.11 9 In addition, the Court found that a plaintiff's quest
for judicial vindication under an existing law will not provide a
legitimate form of redress to meet standing requirements even if
1 20
the punishment of a defendant may deter future harm.
Mootness has been defined by the United States Supreme Court
as the point when the case in question no longer presents a live
controversy that a court may settle or when the parties lack a
legally recognizable interest.' 21 In 1968, the Supreme Court
expressed a stringent standard for finding mootness when the
defendant ceases the activity in question after litigation has
commenced in United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export
114. Id. at 2140, 2142.
115. Id. at 2136.
116. 118 S. Ct. 1003 (1998).
117. Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1020. An environmental organization that used data
reported under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act of 1986
("EPCRA') brought suit in federal district court under the EPCRA:s citizen-suit provision
against the defendant. Id. at 1008-09. The complaint alleged that the manufacturer failed to
file timely chemical reports required under the EPCRA and that the defendant's failure to
provide information in a timely fashion constituted injury-in-fact to the organization and its
members. Id. at 1009. The organization requested relief in the form of a declaratory
judgment, injunctive relief, and civil penalties authorized by the EPCRA. Id. at 1018.
118. Id. at 1019.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Powell v. McCormack, 89 S. Ct. 1944, 1951 (1969).
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Assoc.122 The Court's opinion explained that the test for mootness
in cases seeking injunctive relief against allegedly illegal conduct is
stringent, and voluntary cessation of the conduct in question does
not moot the case.1 23 The Court reasoned that to allow otherwise
would be to leave the defendant free to return to the prior conduct
and, thus, free to continually evade review. 24 Ultimately, the Court
determined that a case may become moot if subsequent events
-make it absolutely clear that the conduct in question cannot
125
reasonably be expected to recur.
The issue of whether voluntary cessation of challenged conduct
will moot a case was revisited by the Court in 1982 in City of
Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc.126 Justice Stevens, writing the
opinion for the Court, noted that a defendant's voluntary cessation
of a questioned activity does not deprive a court of the ability to
rule on the legality of the activity. 27 According to the Court, a
finding of mootness in all situations where the defendant
voluntarily ceases the conduct in question would allow defendants
to consistently and effectively evade review and still perform the
conduct in question.1 28 However, the Court did state that voluntary
cessation of questioned conduct by a defendant is an important
factor that should be taken into account in determining whether a
court should enjoin a defendant from renewing a challenged
practice. 129
122. 89 S. Ct. 361 (1968). An export association made numerous sales of concentrated
phosphate, supplied by its members, to South Korea under the United States foreign aid
program. Id. at 363. The federal government filed a civil antitrust suit for injunctive relief in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, contending that the
concerted activities of the association and its members in regard to such sales violated the
Sherman Act. Id. The association claimed that the sales were exempted from antitrust
liability by the Webb-Pomerene Act as "acts done in the course of export trade." Id.
123. Id. at 364.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. 102 S. Ct. 1070 (1982). A city's licensing ordinance for amusement businesses
required the police to consider whether a license applicant had any "connection with
criminal elements." Id. at 1072. A corporation's application for a license was refused when
the Chief of Police concluded that the corporation was connected with criminal elements. Id.
at 1073. After the corporation successfully brought suit in a Texas state court challenging the
ordinance and obtained an injunction requiring the city to issue it a license, the city adopted
a new ordinance that defined the term "connected with criminal elements" in more detail
than before. Id. at 1074. The corporation commenced an action in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Texas, seeking an injunction against enforcement of the
new ordinance. Id.
127. Id. at 1074.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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The application of the mootness doctrine to a situation wherein a
defendant terminates the conduct in question was addressed by the
130
Supreme Court in the 1983 case of City of Los Angeles v. Lyons.
Justice White stated that the doctrine that a claim does not become
moot when it is capable of repetition yet evades review applies
only in exceptional situations.' 3' According to the Court, even when
the doctrine applies, the plaintiff must make a reasonable showing
32
that he will be subjected to the alleged illegal activity again.
Finally, Justice White stated that mooting a request for injunctive
relief will not automatically moot a claim for penalties or
damages.T M
The dual nature of the mootness doctrine was presented in the
1987 Supreme Court case of Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v.
Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. 34 Justice Marshall, in the
majority opinion, stated that the mootness doctrine protects
plaintiffs from defendants who attempt to evade review of their
actions and, likewise, defendants from plaintiffs who attempt to
bring suit for conduct that is not connected to any current or
future wrongdoing. 135 The majority explained that a plaintiff's case
for injunctive relief will be moot when there is no reasonable
expectation that a wrong will be repeated. 36 Justice Marshall,
however, placed the burden upon the defendant to demonstrate
that it is absolutely clear that the alleged wrongful behavior cannot
137
be reasonably expected to recur.
The 1987 Supreme Court case of Tll v. United States' s explores
how a defendant's post-complaint conduct can affect mootness
130. 103 S. Ct. 1660.
131. Id. at 1669.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. 108 S. Ct. 376 (1987). Between 1981 and 1984, the defendant repeatedly violated
the conditions of a pollutant discharge permit issued for a meat-packing plant. Id. at 379.
However, the company's last reported violation of the permit occurred in May, 1984. Id. at
380. In June, 1984, two environmental groups filed a citizen suit under the CWA against the
defendant company in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Id.
at 379-80. The plaintiffs alleged that the company had violated, and would continue to
violate, the CWA. Id. at 380.
135. Id. at 386.
136. Id. See also City of Los Angeles, 103 S. Ct. at 1665 (1983), where the Court stated
that requests for injunctive relief that hinge solely on past exposure to illegal conduct do not
meet the case and controversy requirement if they are unaccompanied by continuing adverse
effects in the present. Id.
137. Id.
138. 107 S. Ct. 1831 (1987).
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determinations when a plaintiff requests civil damages. 39 According
to the Court, a defendant's post-complaint conduct should not moot
a claim by the plaintiff for civil damages under the provisions of
the CWA. 140 The Court reasoned that claims for civil damages under
the citizen suit provision of the CWA are analogous to claims for
punitive damages that should not be deemed moot due to
post-complaint conduct. 14' Because both forms of sought after
penalties are legal remedies that are not fixed by their nature, the
Court concluded that neither type of claim should be mooted by
42
the defendant's post-complaint conduct.
More recently, in the 1997 case of Atlantic States Legal
Foundation, Inc. v. Stroh Die Casting Co., 43 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the
circumstances wherein the voluntary cessation of a challenged
practice will moot a controversy. 144 The Seventh Circuit held that
injunctive relief could be denied if it is clear that the wrongful
behavior cannot reasonably be expected to recur. 4 5 However, civil
penalties can be recovered for any time during which the defendant
was in violation of an environmental law. 146 Thus, the Seventh
Circuit differentiated between the standards for mooting a case
47
seeking injunctive relief and one seeking civil damages.'
The Supreme Court's ruling in Friends of the Earth'4 should
have a significant impact on the analysis of standing requirements
for citizen suits commenced under federal environmental protection
laws. When contrasted with prior precedent, one concludes that the
most immediate impact of the decision will be its relatively relaxed
injury-in-fact requirements that must be met by plaintiffs. Under the
majority's reasoning, practically any individual citizen or
environmental organization can demonstrate injury-in-fact by simply
arguing that harm was suffered via the loss of aesthetic value and
139. TuU, 107 S. Ct. at 1838. The federal government sued a real estate developer for
dumping fill on wetlands without a permit in violation of the CWA. Id. at 1833. The
government sought both injunctive relief and civil penalties. Id. at 1834.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142.' Id.
143. 116 F.3d 814 (7th Cir. 1997).
144. Atlantic States Legal Found., 116 F3d at 818. This case was brought by the
plaintiff environmental organization under the citizen suit provision of the CWA and dealt
with the defendant's violation of its NPDES permit. Id. at 816.
145. Id. at 820.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. 120 S. Ct. 693 (2000).
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the future loss of recreational use. If injury-in-fact is averred
through loss of economic value, the plaintiff may not be required to
quantify to-date losses. Instead, estimating potential future
economic harm or current loss of economic value might be
sufficient. This reasoning allows for a nexus argument to
demonstrate injury-in-fact and runs counter to prior Supreme Court
decisions such as Lujan,49 which required the plaintiff to show
particularized harm. 150
In addition, the ruling as it pertains to standing requirements also
relaxes the redressability element for prospective plaintiffs. A party
bringing an action under a citizen suit provision can meet
redressability requirements by suggesting that the threat of future
injury by the defendant should allow for the imposition of
additional monetary penalties for past violations. Whether the
penalties are paid to the plaintiff or to the government is irrelevant.
This relaxing of the injury-in-fact and redressability elements of
standing is, in effect, a delegation of federal and state
administrative powers to citizens and runs counter to prior
decisions such as Steel Co.'51
The decision in Friends of the Earth'52 is not a major deviation
from prior Supreme Court precedent with regard to mootness..A
defendant's voluntary cessation of a challenged practice will not
moot the plaintiff's case unless it becomes absolutely clear that the
challenged conduct can not be expected to recur in the future. Any
standard less than this would allow the defendant to evade review
by temporarily ceasing the challenged practice and then restarting
the practice at a later time.
Nicholas J. De~uliis
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112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992).
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152.

118 S. Ct. 1003 (1998).
Friends of the Earth, 120 S. Ct. at 693.

